Sailors driving the McCain were not qualified to be on watch, Navy says

[nitpicker]

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2017/11/02/sailors-driving-the-mccain-were-not-qualified-to-be-on-watch-navy-says/

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2017/11/02/sailors-driving-the-mccain-were-not-qualified-to-be-on-watch-navy-says/

Sailors driving the McCain were not qualified to be on watch, Navy says

By: Mark D. Faram    11 hours ago

Five minutes before the guided missile destroyer McCain collided with a commercial vessel in August, McCain’s commanding officer felt the helmsman was having difficulty steering the ship and controlling its speed — normal duties for the watch station. The skipper then ordered the officer of there deck to change to the ship’s steering configuration so that another sailor could step in and help — a maneuver called splitting the watch. But instead of fixing the problem, the helmsman’s failure to properly carry out the procedure plunged the bridge into chaos and put the ship into a sharp turn that ultimately caused the collision. Ten sailors died as a result of that collision.

The Navy’s accident report, released Thursday, called splitting the watch an “abnormal operating condition,” but multiple Navy experts tell Navy Times that it’s a job a properly trained and qualified bridge team should have been able to handle without incident. Yet McCain’s bridge team was neither experienced nor qualified to the level they should have been to be steaming a warship through crowded waters, and the Navy’s report acknowledged as much, blaming the failures on the bridge team’s insufficient local training and qualifications. That’s because multiple members of the bridge team on watch at the time of the collision were temporarily assigned from the cruiser Antietam and had never officially qualified to operate the bridge equipment on board McCain. The report noted that the differences between the two ship’s steering systems were significant, but none of the watch-standers were given any training to learn the new system.
(snip)

It’s a common thread between both the destroyer Fitzgerald’s collision in June and the McCain collision: A lack of training on key equipment and a weak understanding of ship operating fundamentals, which ultimately led to failures that killed, in total, 17 sailors. The Navy’s report on its own internal review found this to be a common factor in all four of the major mishaps in the Japan-based 7th fleet, which included the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions as well as the grounding of the cruiser Antietam in Tokyo Bay in January and the cruiser Lake Champlain’s collision with a South Korean fishing boat in May. “In each of the four mishaps, the qualification of individuals for specific watchstations did not translate to proficiency to safely execute the mission,” according to the review that was conducted by Fleet Forces Command commander Adm. Phil Davidson.
(snip)

The two collisions — and a total of 17 sailors lost at sea this summer — have raised concerns about whether this generation of surface fleet officers lack the basic core competency of their trade. Many believe those shortfalls in training are rooted in decisions made years before the crashes. “The leadership of the surface Navy 15 years ago began to cut training,” said retired Navy Cmdr. Kirk Lippold, who commanded the guided-missile destroyer Cole. “The result is that today, they don’t emphasize training. So consequently these commanding officers at sea are in the awkward position that they literally don’t know what they don’t know.”

On board the Fitzgerald, investigators determined the ship’s officers didn’t fully comprehend the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions — colloquially known as the “rules of the road” — that define international norms for how ships should interact at sea. Retired Navy Capt. Rich Hoffman, who commanded both the frigate DeWert and the cruiser Hue City, acknowledged that being a professional mariner goes well beyond knowing the rules of the road. But without that basic knowledge, it’s nearly impossible for crews to safely perform complex operations in highly trafficked areas.
(snip)

But the problems on Fitzgerald went deeper than that. The report found that “watch team members were not familiar with basic radar fundamentals, impeding effective use.” The end result was that “watch team members responsible for radar operations failed to properly tune and adjust radars to maintain an accurate picture of other ships in the area.”
(snip)

[PJMcK]

1. I sailed boats for more than 30 years along the east coast

Here are the simplest "rules of the road:"

Stay out of the way of other vessels.

Communicate with other vessels in your vicinity.

When in doubt, slow down or stop.

It's amazing to me that the Seventh Fleet has such basic failings among its operational officers. The U.S. spends a tremendous amount of money on its military yet time after time we taxpayers find out that that money is spent on expensive hardware and not on educating our service people how to use it wisely.

Our government fails its people all of the time.

[Irish_Dem]

2. The Navy has a budge of $171 Billion and they don't know how to pilot ships? nt

[Nitram]

3. I'm glad the investigation identified the problem. Lack of proper training and

improperly assigning crew to tasks for which they are not properly qualified. It is a serious one, and the entire Navy should immediately take steps to rectify it.

[JayhawkSD]

4. It should not have gotten to this point.

The lack of training and proper supervision should have been recognized and corrected long before ships were near as dammit sunk and lives were lost. How could they not realize a systemic problem when a crew forgot to refill the main propulsion gearbox with lubricating oil, resulting in a shipyard repair?

This is most certainly not the Navy I served in. Or would want to serve in. This in a Navy that has so little self respect that it doesn't even bother to wear dress uniform when it goes out in public. We would have not been caught dead wearing working uniforms in public, and without hats, no less. Shameful.

[flotsam]

5. Essentially the watch crew understood...

...less about seamanship than a 12 year old with a Sunfish.....

[nitpicker]

6. More details and commentary at this link

https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/what-we-learned-from-the-navys-collision-inquiries/