More MIC Welfare Means Less For We The People
Yesterday I talked about a $22.9 billion dollar artist's conception of our 'new' Navy.
Let's talk about MIC welfare.
In addition to pay $12.9 billion dollars for the UNFINISHED USS Gerald R Ford, our congress-critters want to/already have plunked down another $4 billion dollars in an attempt to have Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc. build an aircraft carrier that actually comes in at the agreed upon price.
Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Virginia wants to replace all Ohio-class submarines with next-generation nuclear-armed submarines. Virginia-class submarines now cost somewhere between $7 ~ $9 billion dollars each. Good luck with that Randy.
Speaking of Randy, he also wants to stop (military) sequestration. To refresh your memory, sequestration occurred because Rs and Ds could not agree on where the cuts in the discretionary budget should come from. Both sides agreed on $50 billion dollar cuts to military programs AND social programs. Looks like sequestration is for Democrats, not Republicans.
Poor us. 
= new reply since forum marked as read
poor us.....
Ike was right with his comments on the MIC.
What GAO Found
The extent to which the lead Ford-class ship, CVN 78, will be delivered by its current March 2016 delivery date and within the Navy's $12.9 billion estimate is dependent on the Navy's plan to defer work and costs to the post-delivery period. Lagging construction progress as well as ongoing issues with key technologies further exacerbate an already compressed schedule and create further cost and schedule risks. With the shipbuilder embarking on one of the most complex phases of construction with the greatest likelihood for cost growth, cost increases beyond the current $12.9 billion cost cap appear likely. In response, the Navy is deferring some work until after ship delivery to create a funding reserve to pay for any additional cost growth stemming from remaining construction risks. This strategy will result in the need for additional funding later, which the Navy plans to request through its post-delivery and outfitting budget account. However, this approach obscures visibility into the true cost of the ship and results in delivering a ship that is less complete than initially planned.
CVN 78 will deploy without demonstrating full operational capabilities because it cannot achieve certain key requirements according to its current test schedule. Key requirements—such as increasing aircraft launch and recovery rates—will likely not be met before the ship is deployment ready and could limit ship operations. Further, CVN 78 will not meet a requirement that allows for increases to the size of the crew over the service life of the ship. In fact, the ship may not even be able to accommodate the likely need for additional crew to operate the ship without operational tradeoffs. Since GAO's last report in September 2013, post-delivery plans to test CVN 78's capabilities have become more compressed, further increasing the likelihood that CVN 78 will not deploy as scheduled or will deploy without fully tested systems.
The Navy is implementing steps to achieve the $11.5 billion congressional cost cap for the second ship, CVN 79, but these are largely based on ambitious efficiency gains and reducing a significant amount of construction, installation, and testing—work traditionally completed prior to ship delivery. Since GAO last reported in September 2013, the Navy extended CVN 79's construction preparation contract to allow additional time for the shipbuilder to reduce cost risks and incorporate lessons learned from construction of CVN 78. At the same time, the Navy continues to revise its acquisition strategy for CVN 79 in an effort to ensure that costs do not exceed the cost cap, by postponing installation of some systems until after ship delivery, and deferring an estimated $200 million - $250 million in previously planned capability upgrades of the ship's combat systems to be completed well after the ship is operational. Further, if CVN 79 construction costs should grow above the legislated cost cap, the Navy may choose to use funding intended for work to complete the ship after delivery to cover construction cost increases. As with CVN 78, the Navy could choose to request additional funding through post-delivery budget accounts not included in calculating the ship's end cost. Navy officials view this as an approach to managing the cost cap. However, doing so impairs accountability for actual ship costs.
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Sure sounds UNFINISHED to me.
